The foregoing shows to what extent the integration of greater relationality into Western conceptions of self would not amount to a mere modus vivendi. Often enough, integration of such from other cultures will pass through the latter two modes above, i.e. modified fitting or thoroughgoing translation. Whether this be necessary, it remains beyond the scope of this provisional study to prove.
If worries about increased cultural comparison ending in a mere modus vivendi persist, the author can have no other recourse than to underline the importance of a critical approach and highlight the dangers. As to the first of these modes of integration above, i.e. wholecloth adoption, he suggests that we must remain wary, for with greater relationality can also come greater deference and fewer possibilities for resistance via individuality. Such a quandary is highlighted when Baggini recalls:
We might also consider the value of Confucian harmony in politics, as Daniel Bell urges us to do in his recent book “The China Model.” Harmony is found when our social relations are good, and to be good they require openness about disagreement and conflicts of interest. Harmony is not an aspiration for bland uniformity. As Bell points out, “One of the most famous lines in the Analects of Confucius – known to most educated Chinese – is that exemplary persons should pursue harmony but not consensus (or uniformity).”
Again, relationality as regards politics requires openness and divergence, rather than a universal tendency towards uniformity. Thus, wholecloth adoption could not consistently be carried out across the board without losing sight of the very reasons for which we initially undertook the study. The translation of relationality, as well as the principles of openness and divergence, can perhaps be best seen in pragmatic deliberative democracy and the organizing to which we have previously made reference. Insofar as these open a space for individuals to discuss their concerns, be it within or across cultural boundaries, and accumulate power through their collected tellings and listenings, they resist the powers that be via their connection in other-regarding behavior and, perhaps more importantly, their very individuality, i.e. their unwillingness to adopt wholecloth types.
If the foregoing may make it seem that there exists an ideal arrangement in order to maximize individual/selfhood and relationality, such a reading must be reeled in. For there can be no perfectly maximizing institutional arrangement. Any such appropriation from comparative relationality studies will encounter limits as not all principles can be simultaneously instantiated. Baggini hones in on such a point when he notes:
However, such appropriation has its limits because of what Isaiah Berlin called the plurality of values, meaning that more than one set is justifiable but they may also be incompatible. Gains from greater community, for example, result in losses for real values arising from individual autonomy. If we therefore set out to decide which set of values is right and which is wrong we often ask the wrong question. Both have their losses and gains, and you can’t have one with the other.
In a word, everything comes with a cost; to greater expenses for relationality may be joined real costs for individuality. Practices and institutions can admit of no ideal relationality formulae, but this should in and of itself offer no deterrent to vigorous experimentation in our conception of other-regarding work on the self.