Fr. 95

If all philosophy entails the creation of concepts, then Deleuze and Guattari necessarily put forth, formulate or identify their own concept of philosophy. In turn, this concept of philosophy is made up of components, which are the ideas that are joined by their own indiscernability, i.e. the necessary logical transition from one component to another in the consideration of this concept. Simply, it is impossible to consider this without immediately thereafter considering this other.

The components of the concept of metaphilosophy (of philosophy in general) are: totality, fragment, auto-reference, and incommensurability. (These bring to mind the discussion of Fr. 67.)

Totality, for, in giving a response to a particular question, problem, or worry, the concept necessarily overextends itself to the domain of other concepts and the whole of existence. This is the totalizing function. One might also that there exists nothing outside of or beyond this concept, and that it has everything of which it needs to respond to this particular problem, all of which amounts to its being total.

Fragment, for, in responding to a particular question, problem or worry, the concept responds to this and only this.  As it is not formulated as a response to “everything” but to the “particular”, its response is necessarily a partial one. At minimum, a concept has two components; at maximum, it must stop short of containing all possible components, for then it would no longer be thinkable as a particular mental entity and would therefore be meaningless.

Auto-reference, for, in providing a response to a particular problem, question, or worry, the concept responds only to itself. The “answer” provided therein is only comprehensible if considered in strict relation with the problem. Once one passes beyond the bounds of this problem, the concept no longer furnishes an answer, for it was not conceived as a response to other problems or questions. Its external reference is limited to the reference between its components. Likewise, its internal reference is limited to the components conceived as a whole, i.e. the concept itself as a discrete mental entity.

Incommensurability, for, in giving a response to particular problem, question, or worry, the concept’s response is the sole response to this particular question. To give another response to this same question would be to respond to another question entirely, albeit one that could be largely similar. As such, this is the response to this question and to this question alone; it cannot provide an answer to another question or problem as they likewise have their own concept-responses. In turn, no other concept responds to the precise formulation or make-up of this problem, leaving no other concept fit to respond to the difficulties contained therein.

Might there be other components to the metaphilosophy of Deleuze and Guattari, such as immanence? Or is this possibility limited to its role in the plane of immanence as one-third of the philosophical endeavor, along with conceptual characters?